Administrative Waiver of the Untimeliness Defense in Title VII Cases Concerning Federal Employees: A Proposed Analysis by Dolley, Kevin J.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 46 
Number 2 (Spring 2002) Article 14 
4-24-2002 
Administrative Waiver of the Untimeliness Defense in Title VII 
Cases Concerning Federal Employees: A Proposed Analysis 
Kevin J. Dolley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin J. Dolley, Administrative Waiver of the Untimeliness Defense in Title VII Cases Concerning Federal 
Employees: A Proposed Analysis, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. (2002). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol46/iss2/14 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
477 
ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER OF THE UNTIMELINESS DEFENSE IN 
TITLE VII CASES CONCERNING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES: A 
PROPOSED ANALYSIS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Waiver is a troublesome term in law . . . .  It is used with different meanings 
and there are, therefore, necessarily conflicting judicial statements as to its 
requisites.”1 
Imagine that Peter Gibbons,2 an unremarkable computer programmer for 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), applies for a supervisory position at 
the VA.3  He has been very vocal in complaining that he has never received a 
promotion, and following this most recent promotion denial, determines it is 
time to take action.4  Peter feels his promotion denial is the result of 
discrimination and retaliation for past complaints.5 
Under Title VII provisions pertaining to federal employees, Peter is 
required to meet two deadlines as prerequisites to completion of the 
administrative process.6  Peter is late in meeting the deadline for filing a formal 
administrative complaint.7  Despite missing this deadline, an Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) investigator examines the merit of Peter’s 
complaint, finds in a final decision that no discrimination occurred, and issues 
 
 1. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 678 (3d ed. 1961). 
 2. Peter Gibbons (played by Ron Livingston) was a character in the movie OFFICE SPACE 
(20th Century Fox 1999).  He was a run-of-the-mill computer programmer for Initech prior to a 
change in personality stemming from his disillusionment with his current work situation.  His 
change in personality launched him into middle management and trouble.  In this hypothetical, 
unfortunately, Peter is denied entry into management. 
 3. This hypothetical is based largely upon Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 4. Id. at 1070. 
 5. Id. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972.  The hope of the amendment was elimination of discrimination in 
federal employment.  See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 849 (1976).  Congress adopted 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 because of indications that the Civil Service Commission was unable to 
satisfactorily thwart discrimination in the federal sector.  See Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 379 F. Supp. 589, 593 (S.D. Tex. 1974). 
 6. A complainant, as part of the administrative process for federal employees, is required to 
“initiate contact” with an EEO counselor and later file an administrative complaint with the 
agency that the complainant claimed discriminated against him or her.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 
1614.105(a)(1), 1614.106(b) (2001). 
 7. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1070-71. 
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a right-to-sue letter based on a finding of no discrimination.8  Peter, with the 
aid of a lawyer, files a lawsuit in federal district court within ninety days after 
receipt of his right-to-sue letter.9  This suit is based on claims of sex 
discrimination and retaliation.  The VA, in its answer to the complaint, cites 
for the first time Peter’s late filing of the administrative complaint as a failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely manner.  Thus, the VA’s answer 
concludes that, based on the untimeliness defense, the complaint should be 
dismissed.10  But untimeliness had not been raised at the administrative level.  
Is Peter’s lawsuit going to be dismissed or did the VA waive the defense of 
untimeliness?  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197211 provides the sole 
avenue whereby federal employees may claim job discrimination on account of 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.12  In providing coverage for federal 
employees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, no administrative structure was 
established for federal employees.  Specifically, no time limits under which an 
employee claiming discrimination must act were set out in § 2000e-16.  The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however, was 
empowered under § 2000e-16(b) to issue rules13 for the efficient administration 
of Title VII for federal employees and establish the requirement of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies.14 
The federal courts are nearly uniform in concluding that an agency does 
not waive the untimeliness defense just because it admitted a complaint and 
then proceeded with an investigation.15  There is a split in the circuits, 
however, over what approach to take when the administrative agency fails to 
 
 8. See § 1614.110.  The right-to-sue letter is provided to the complainant at the end of the 
administrative process with a finding by the agency.  See id.  If there is no discrimination upon 
which the agency can act to remedy, the agency need not further pursue the complaint.  Thus, 
with administrative options closed, the complainant is provided the right to pursue relief in 
federal court.  See id. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 10. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071. 
 11. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 111 
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994 & Supp. V. 1999)). 
 12. § 2000e-16(a). 
 13. The EEOC regulations covering federal employees begin at 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2001). 
 14. See Bragg v. Reed, 592 F.2d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting the exhaustion 
requirement); Swain v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); Ettinger v. Johnson, 
518 F.2d 648, 651-52 (3d Cir. 1975) (same). 
 15. See Huntley v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 550 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(concluding that “once [a government] agency [has] accepted [a] complaint and [has] acted on it, 
the time limit mentioned in the regulations is not mandatory”); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 
389-90 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the contention that by merely accepting and investigating a tardy 
complaint an agency waives its objection to a complainant’s failure to comply with time limits 
unless the agency has done a good deal more than simply accept and investigate the complaint). 
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make a ruling on the timeliness issue at the administrative level but the agency 
then raises an untimeliness defense when the case reaches district court.  This 
Comment examines a circuit split over the proper framework federal courts 
should use in analyzing the issue of waiver of the untimeliness defense when 
the affirmative defense is not raised at the administrative level but a final 
decision is provided by the agency on the merits of the complaint. 
The recommended approach is based on principles from Ester v. 
Principi,16 along with the import of “technical defect”17 analysis.  The Seventh 
Circuit in Ester provided three fundamental principles of administrative law 
that courts should examine when ruling on a case that involves the affirmative 
defense of untimeliness being raised, when timeliness was not raised at the 
administrative level.18  These three principles are:  the need for objection at the 
administrative level, the need for courts to stand behind the reasons provided at 
the administrative level and the need for independent grounds for dismissal of 
a case to be raised initially at the administrative level.19  Further, “technical 
defects”, such as untimely filing, should be resolved at the administrative level 
so that court review is limited to policy-based considerations.20 
Part II of this Comment describes the development of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies and when exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is waived in federal Title VII actions.  Part III analyzes the circuit 
split over the proper analysis for examining the waiver of the exhaustion 
requirement in federal sector Title VII actions when the defense is not raised at 
the administrative level.  Part IV provides the author’s newly developed 
analysis based on examination of cases within the differing circuits and general 
principles of waiver.  This Comment concludes by reiterating the need for 
courts to recognize the issues implicated when untimeliness is not found by an 
administrative agency and by evaluating the likelihood for change in this area 
of the law in conformance with the above-recommended reasoning. 
II.  BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND WAIVER 
A. General Principles of Exhaustion 
 
 16. 250 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2001).  In Ester, Judge Williams of the Seventh Circuit analyzed 
the issue of waiver of the untimeliness defense based upon the need for objection before 
administrative agencies to preserve issues for appeal, the need for agencies to state the reasons for 
their actions and stand behind those reasons in later proceedings, and the need for independent 
grounds of dismissal such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies to be stated by the agency 
prior to the case reaching federal court.  See id. at 1071-73.  See also infra notes 101-122. 
 17. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 18. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1070-73. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Time Warner, 144 F.3d at 80. 
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Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requirement that all steps in the 
administrative process be completed prior to a complainant being able to file 
suit in district court.21  The exhaustion requirement makes a complainant go 
through a series of steps seeking review of an adverse decision with the goal of 
obtaining a remedy based on the prior administrative action being unlawful or 
otherwise inappropriate.22  In the context of federal sector EEO complaints, 
exhaustion serves important policies such as encouraging “informal, 
conciliation-oriented resolution of disputes and reduc[ing] the burden on 
federal courts.”23 
Exhaustion allows an agency to make use of its expertise24 under a 
particular statutory structure in providing an initial evaluation of a case, 25 
developing the facts of the case, 26 and stating the reasons for its decision.27  
Exhaustion also provides agencies an assurance that its internal procedures will 
not be disrupted by premature resort to the courts.28  Finally, exhaustion allows 
for an agency to correct errors prior to review by a court.29  The overarching 
 
 21. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (“Of course, courts play an 
important role in determining the limits of an exhaustion requirement and may impose such a 
requirement even where Congress has not expressly so provided.”); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 
U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (“[A]ppropriate deference to Congress’ power to prescribe the basic 
procedural scheme under which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning of 
exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable 
statutory scheme.”); Bernard Schwartz, “Apotheosis Of Mediocrity”?: The Rehnquist Court and 
Administrative Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 141 (1994). 
 22. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 
(1985). 
 23. Sampson v. Civiletti, 632 F.2d 860, 862-63 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 24. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969); see also Robinson v. Dalton, 
107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64-65 
(1956). 
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency 
are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally 
exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances 
underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, 
by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure. 
Id. 
 25. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 195.  See also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 
(1980) (noting Standard Oil was unable to establish irreparable harm by engaging in the 
administrative process and that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a complainant 
can turn to the courts). 
 26. See In re Steele, 799 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he purposes underlying the 
exhaustion doctrine include the opportunity for the agency to exercise its discretion and expertise 
and the opportunity to make a record for the district court to review.”) (citations omitted). 
 27. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 195. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
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principle of exhaustion is best summarized as: “The long-settled rule of 
judicial administration [is] that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a 
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has 
been exhausted.”30 
There are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.31  McKart v. United 
States,32 set in the context of a criminal prosecution, provided that when a 
person no longer has the ability to return to the administrative process and the 
application of exhaustion is “exceedingly harsh,” courts must take a closer 
examination of the circumstances surrounding the requirement of exhaustion.33  
Specifically, the Court stated: 
We are not here faced with a premature resort to the courts—all administrative 
remedies are now closed to petitioner . . . .  We cannot agree that application of 
the exhaustion doctrine would be proper in the circumstances of the present 
case . . . .  There is simply no overwhelming need for the court to have the 
agency finally resolve this question in the first instance, at least not where the 
administrative process is at an end . . . .34 
In Sampson v. Civiletti,35 the Tenth Circuit found that 
[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies can often be what its name implies, 
exhausting.  It is easy for a person, especially one . . . who chooses to process 
his claim without the assistance of an attorney, to be tripped up by the lengthy 
procedures and short deadlines.  Thus, the administrative requirements “are not 
to be interpreted in an overly technical manner.”36 
Based on examination of various courts’ analyses of the exhaustion issue, 
Kenneth Culp Davis, in his treatise on administrative law, found that four 
factors were used to determine whether exhaustion of the administrative 
process would be required.37  These factors are: 
 
 30. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). 
 31. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193. 
 32. 395 U.S. 185 (1969). 
 33. McKart, 395 U.S. at 197.  But see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433-34 (1944) 
(stating that a person who does not take the opportunity to challenge a rule that he violated at the 
administrative level cannot take up such a challenge in subsequent criminal proceeding); United 
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838 (1987); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 
U.S. 275, 283 (1978) (stating judicial review not available because administrative opportunity to 
challenge rule was not taken by petitioner). 
 34. McKart, 395 U.S. at 196-97, 199. 
 35. 632 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 36. Sampson, 632 F.2d at 863 (citations omitted); see also Hoffman v. Boeing, 596 F.2d 
683, 685 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 37. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 15.2  (3d ed. 1994). 
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(1) the extent of injury to petitioner from requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, (2) the degree of difficulty of merits issue the court is 
asked to resolve, (3) the extent to which judicial resolution of merits issue will 
be aided by agency factfinding or application of expertise, and (4) the extent to 
which the agency has already completed its factfinding or applied its 
expertise.38 
As a clarifying point, Davis noted that these factors do not always point in 
exactly the same direction, but that the use of these factors provides some 
clarity and “will aid considerably in rationalizing and simplifying the law of 
exhaustion.”39 
B. General Principles of Waiver 
The waiver doctrine is largely based on the premise that arguments not 
raised at the administrative level by the complainant or the agency should not 
be considered by courts.40  Therefore, a court’s analysis should be limited to 
examining the reasoning provided by the agency.41  This “general rule” was set 
out in United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.42 as: “courts should not 
topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only 
has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its 
practice.”43  This principle promotes determination of issues at the 
administrative level, thus resolving conflicts before a resort to the court 
system.44 
 
 38. Id. at 315. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Massachusetts, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sec’y of Agric., 984 F.2d 514, 523 (1st Cir. 
1993) (citations omitted); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 497 
(1955) (“No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the Court (of 
Appeals) unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application 
for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do.”); Kirk v. Fed. Prop. Mgmt. 
Corp., 22 F.3d 135, 139 (7th Cir. 1994); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 
143, 155 (1946); Tourus Records, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 259 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (finding that an agency must set forth the reasons for its actions and the court is 
constrained to examine only the agency determination regardless of whether such a determination 
is overly limited in scope); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2000); D & 
F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Proper v. Apfel, 140 F. 
Supp. 2d 478, 484 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 41. See Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 67, 70 (4th Cir. 1994); Northern 
Wind, Inc. v. Daley, 200 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power 
Auth., 106 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220 (D. Puerto Rico 2000). 
 42. 344 U.S. 33 (1952). 
 43. Id. at 37.  But see Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1988). 
 44. See Borden v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(summarizing the theory of waiver by stating: “[p]arties must take before the [agency], ‘not only 
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If an agency does not recognize an issue at the administrative level and 
provide examination of the issue, it is likely unworthy of examination by the 
courts.  The duty of courts is not to “sift pleadings and document to 
identify[]arguments that are not ‘stated with clarity’” during the administrative 
process.45  If a reviewing court analyzes issues not raised at the administrative 
level, it “usurps the agency’s function . . . and deprives the [agency] of an 
opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its 
actions.”46  A waiver based on an issue not being raised at the administrative 
level, however, has not been found where the administrative process is merely 
inquisitorial and not adversarial.47  Under such circumstances, formal objection 
is not required to preserve an issue for appeal.48 
An evolution in the area of exhaustion was the D.C. Circuit’s development, 
in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC,49 of a distinction between 
“technical defects” and “policy-based errors” made at the administrative 
level.50  A “technical defect” must be raised at the administrative level or 
review of the issue is waived in district court.  But, if an issue not raised at the 
administrative level is a “policy-based error,” there must be an examination of 
whether the issue was implicated as part of a broader argument.51  If part of a 
broader argument, the issue is preserved for court examination.52  For example, 
failure to meet a time limit for completing the administrative process would 
likely fall under the rubric of “technical defect.”  Therefore, the matter must be 
raised at the administrative level.53 
C. The Administrative Process for Federal Employees 
 
their ‘best shot’ but all of their shots’”) (citation omitted); Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 
945 (9th Cir. 1999); Kirk, 22 F.3d at 139. 
 45. Bartholdi Cable Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 46. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946). 
 47. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 109-10 (2000); Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets 
Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative 
Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997); Gary E. O’Connor, Did Decide or Should Have 
Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the Veterans Benefits Appeals Process, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1279 
(2000). 
 48. Sims, 530 U.S. at 109-10. 
 49. 144 F.3d 75, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 50. Id. at 80.  A “technical defect” is defined by the D.C. Circuit as an error that “could 
easily have been cured if called to the Commission’s attention on reconsideration.”  Id. 
 51. Id. at 80-81.  The D.C. Circuit defined a “policy-based error” as a “basic challenge to a 
Commission policy[.]”  Id. at 81.  See also Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 250 F.3d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
 52. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 53. Id. 
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There are two administrative time limits a federal employee seeking to file 
suit against the government must meet as a condition precedent to reaching 
district court.54  First, the employee must “initiate contact”55 with an EEO 
counselor within forty-five days56 of an alleged act of discrimination or within 
forty-five days from the effective date that a “personnel action” alleged to be 
discriminatory occurred.57  If a federal employee does not contact an EEO 
counselor within forty-five days, the employee’s complaint could be dismissed 
at the administrative level for noncompliance with administrative prerequisites 
to exhaustion.58  
The agency is required to have a “final interview with the aggrieved 
person” within thirty days of the date the aggrieved person contacted the 
agency’s EEO office to request counseling.”59  If informal methods employed 
by the agency cannot induce a settlement of the allegations raised in the initial 
contact, the complainant, to continue the administrative process, must file a 
formal administrative complaint.60  The second time limit that a complainant 
must meet as part of the administrative process is filing of a formal 
administrative complaint “with the agency that allegedly discriminated against 
the complainant” within fifteen days after receipt of notice to file such a 
complaint.61  An employee who does not file an administrative complaint 
 
 54. Cf. Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting two intra-agency 
deadlines and a deadline for filing a lawsuit in district court for a federal employee pursuing a 
Title VII action). 
 55. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2001). 
 56. The requirement under § 1614.105(a)(1) for the initiation of contact to be within forty-
five days is a modification, following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, from a requirement that 
contact be initiated within thirty days.  See Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 57 
Fed. Reg. 12,634 (April 10, 1992). 
 57. § 1614.105(a)(1); see also Bickham v. Miller, 584 F.2d 736, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(establishing that the tolling period for filing a complaint of discrimination begins when the facts 
that establish a charge of discrimination would be apparent to a similarly situated person with a 
reasonably prudent recognition of his rights); Aiken v. Reilly, No. 90-0987-LFO, 1991 WL 
126000, at *3 (D. D.C. 1991). 
 58. § 1614.105(a)(1); see also Johnson v. United States Treasury Dep’t, 27 F.3d 415, 416 
(9th Cir. 1994); Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985); Brown v. 
Gen. Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); Zografov v. V.A. Med. Ctr., 779 F.2d 967, 970 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 59. § 1614.105(d). 
 60. See § 1614.104(b) (indicating that federal agencies must employ “reasonable efforts” to 
insure complaints are resolved in an informal fashion); § 1614.105(a); § 1614.105(f) (noting 
alternative dispute resolution is available to federal employees who present a complaint that lies 
under the rubric of Title VII). 
 61. § 1614.106(b); § 1614.105(d). 
The notice shall inform the complainant of the right to file a discrimination complaint 
within 15 days of receipt of the notice, of the appropriate official with whom to file a 
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within the fifteen days after the final interview, as with the failure to meet the 
forty-five day requirement to “initiate contact” with an EEO counselor, could 
have his or her administrative complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.62  If the administrative agency issues a “final 
action”63 pursuant to § 1614.110 based on the issues raised in the 
administrative complaint, an employee must file an action in district court 
within ninety days.64 
Failure of the complainant to meet the time limit for “initiating contact” or 
filing a formal administrative complaint will establish the basis for an 
affirmative defense for the defendant agency in a Title VII action brought in 
district court by a federal employee.65 The two administrative deadlines are not 
likened to jurisdictional requirements, but are instead akin to statutes of 
limitations.66  Because the administrative deadlines are subject to the same 
 
complaint and of the complainant’s duty to assure that the agency is informed 
immediately if the complainant retains counsel or a representative. 
Id. 
 62. § 1614.106(b); see also Miller v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 386, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1994); Baker v. 
Runyon, 951 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Baunchand v. Runyon, 847 F. Supp. 449, 450 
(M.D. La. 1994); Tillett v. Carlin, 637 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. Conn. 1986); Quillen v. United 
States Postal Serv., 564 F. Supp. 314, 317 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Baber v. Runyon, No. 97 
CIV.4798(DLC), 1998 WL 912065, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Chalom v. Perkins, No. 97 
Civ.9505(LAP), 1998 WL 851610, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 63. See § 1614.110. 
The final decision shall consist of findings by the agency on the merits of each issue in the 
complaint, or, as appropriate, the rationale for dismissing any claims in the complaint and, 
when discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and relief in accordance with subpart 
E of this part.  The final action shall contain notice of the right to appeal the final action to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the right to file a civil action in federal 
court, the name of the proper defendant in any such lawsuit and applicable time limits for 
appeals and lawsuits. 
Id.  Section 1614.110(a) covers a situation where an administrative agency takes a final action 
following an administrative law judge issuing a decision regarding the case.  Section 1614.110(b) 
contains nearly identical language but covers a situation where there is no finding by an 
administrative law judge and the administrative agency isues its own findings as part of the final 
action.  If there is a finding of discrimination, the principal burden is on the agency and EEOC to 
fashion just relief.  See § 1614.110(b).  Use of the administrative process allows federal agencies 
to discretely resolve internal conflict and avoid having the federal courts enter such conflicts to 
the greatest extent possible.  See Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, supra note 56 
(“the earliest possible contact with a counselor aids resolution of disputes because positions on 
both sides have not yet hardened”); see also President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (commenting that the exhaustion doctrine should not be “a massive procedural roadblock 
to access to the courts”). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a), (c) (2001). 
 65. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105(a)(1), 1614.106(b) (2001).  See also infra note 67. 
 66. See generally Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1042 (1984); Dailey v. Carlin, 654 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Downey v. Runyon, 
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analysis as statutes of limitations, equitable principles apply to the failure to 
meet the administrative deadlines, namely, principles of “waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling.”67  The doctrines of estoppel and equitable tolling have been 
extensively discussed by courts and commentators and are viable equitable 
principles upon which an employee can have a seemingly late claim accepted 
as timely.68  The focus of this Comment, however, will be limited to 
examination of the equitable principle of waiver. 
D. Principles of Exhaustion and Waiver when a Specific Finding of 
Timeliness or Untimeliness is made at the Administrative Level in Federal 
Sector EEO Cases 
When an agency finds that a federal employee met the requirements for 
completion of the administrative process in a timely or untimely manner, 
federal courts normally follow such rulings and do not find a waiver of the 
untimeliness defense in light of a finding of untimeliness.69  The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) in Girard v. Rubin70 initially held Girard’s complaint to 
be untimely, but upon appeal to the EEOC’s Office of Review and Appeals, 
the EEOC determined in a final order that the complaint was timely.71  In 
 
160 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); Pauling v. Secy of the Dep’t of Int., 71 F. Supp. 2d 231, 232-33 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ross v. United States Postal Service, 696 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Andrzejewski v. United States Postal Service, 636 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Bethel v. 
Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 
429, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Braham v. State Ins. Fund, No. 97 Civ.7121 (DLC), 1999 WL 
14011, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1999); Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 419 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 67. Codified in § 1614.604(c). See also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 
393 (1982) (noting the general proposition that Title VII deadlines are commensurate to statute of 
limitations). 
 68. See generally Irwin v. Dept of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (contending that 
while it is true that the deadline provisions of Title VII are subject to equitable estoppel, the 
doctrine will not be applied before a Title VII plaintiff proves that the defendant engaged in 
affirmative misconduct intended to mislead or deceive plaintiff and also that “principles of 
equitable tolling . . . do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable 
neglect.”); Kathryn Doi, Equitable Modification of Title VII Time Limitations to Promote 
Statute’s Remedial Nature: The Case for Maximum Application of the Zipes Rationale, 18 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 749 (1985); Cynthia Reed, Time Limits for Federal Employees Under Title VII: 
Jurisdictional Prerequisites or Statutes of Limitation?, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1371 (1990); Mark D. 
Laponsky, Procedural Problems and Considerations in Representing Federal Employees in 
Equal Employment Opportunity Disputes, 29 HOW. L.J. 503 (1986). 
 69. See generally Stockton v. Harris, 434 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (D.D.C. 1977).  But see 
Kushner v. Glickman, No. C96-1380MHP, 1997 WL 419402, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 1997) 
(noting that courts should not be overly mechanical in judging whether complainant has met short 
time deadlines under Title VII structure for federal employees). 
 70. 62 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 71. Id. at 1246, 1247. 
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district court, the IRS contended again that Girard failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies by not filing a timely complaint.72  The court agreed 
and dismissed the complaint.73  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with the district court and remanded the case for deliberation on the 
merits of the case.74  The court placed its focus on the final decision of the 
EEOC as establishing a legal fiction.75  Although Girard clearly missed the 
filing date, the EEOC’s decision, ruling his complaint timely, made it so.76  
The court focused on the language in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) that “the 
agency shall extend the time limits . . . for other reasons considered sufficient 
by the agency.”77  Based on this language, the EEOC was permitted to forward 
the legal fiction of an untimely complaint being determined timely.78 The court 
did not rest on its statutory construction but forwarded policy reasons for its 
conclusion.79  The court stated: 
When a government employee seeks to pursue a claim of discrimination under 
Title VII or the ADEA, the government cannot be at war with itself.  Protean 
though it may sometimes be, it cannot in its EEOC form say that the employee 
may go forward, while in its IRS form it says he may not.  Once the EEOC 
determined that Girard was entitled to pursue his discrimination claims the IRS 
was not entitled to ask a court to hold otherwise.  It was bound.80 
In Ward v. Califano,81 the Civil Service Commission Board determined 
that the complaint was timely and remanded it to the agency for determination 
on the merits.82  Upon a second remand, the Commission determined that 
discrimination had not occurred.83  The District of Columbia District Court, 
ruling on the issue of timeliness, stated that the statute of limitations should not 
bar the action.84  The defendant agency could not claim it would suffer 
 
 72. See id. at 1246. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 1247. 
 75. Girard, 62 F.3d at 1247 
 76. See id. at 1247-48; see also Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Humm v. Crowell, No. 97-5988, 1998 WL 869981, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998); Henderson v. 
U.S. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 77. Girard, 62 F.3d at 1246. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 1248. 
 80. See id. 
 81. 443 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 82. See id. at  91. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
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prejudice to now defend the action based on the extensive administrative 
attention the complaint had received and the finding of timeliness.85 
Focusing now on when a complaint is ruled untimely at the administrative 
level, courts normally follow the ruling of untimeliness made by an agency.86  
In Almaguer v. Walker,87 the claimant was ten months late in meeting the 
requirement of filing a formal administrative complaint within fifteen days.88  
Upon receipt of the formal complaint, the Army requested further information 
regarding the complaint.89  The plaintiff submitted that the defense of 
untimeliness was waived based on the memorandum.90  The court noted that 
the memorandum stated no “legal conclusions” which established agency 
waiver of the untimeliness defense.91  The court noted Munoz v. Aldridge92 for 
the proposition that “automatic waiver [can be] found where [the] agency has 
done a good deal more than simply accept and investigate plaintiff[’]s 
complaint.”93 The court, citing Munoz, stated there is an automatic waiver of 
the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies after a certain level 
of administrative action.94  The final ruling of the agency, however, was that 
 
 85. See id. at 91 n.2 (“By fulfilling the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), any defects 
alleged in the filing of the original EEO complaint essentially become irrelevant.  This is 
especially true where the agency accepted the complaint and a final decision was rendered.”).  But 
see Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 168-69 (D. Md. 2000).  In Adams, an Administrative 
Judge (AJ) for the Postal Service found that the complaint was timely filed.  The Postal Service, 
declining to follow the finding of the AJ, ruled the complaint untimely.  See id. at 169.  The 
Maryland District Court disregarded both findings and stated, in its own judgment, the complaint 
was untimely.  See id. at 168-69.  The court did not examine whether any “specific finding” of 
timeliness constituted a waiver of the timeliness defense.  See id. at 169. 
 86. See, e.g., Wrenn v. Sec’y, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 918 F.2d 1073, 1078 (2d Cir. 
1990); Bruno v. Brady, Civ. A. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 1992).  In 
Bruno, the complainant did not raise the issue of discrimination to an EEO counselor within thirty 
days of when the discriminatory act took place.  See id. at *2.  The Administrative Law Judge 
failed to supply analysis on the timeliness issue in its decision, and the agency’s final agency 
decision made no mention as to untimeliness and dismissed the complaint on the merits.  See id. 
at *3.  Despite there being no formal finding of untimeliness, the court found the untimeliness 
defense preserved based on the government attorney raising the untimeliness defense during 
adjudication at the administrative level.  See id.  The district court, ruling based on objection 
within the administrative process, found that the untimeliness issue was not waived and the 
complaint was to be dismissed as untimely.  See id. 
 87. 1999 WL 33289710 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2001). 
 88. See id. at *5. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. 894 F.2d 1489 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 93. See Almaguer, 1999 WL 33289710, at *5 n.28 (citing Munoz, 894 F.2d at 1494). 
 94. See id. 
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the complaint was untimely and the district court followed the agency’s 
specific finding of untimeliness. 95 
Even when a settlement is negotiated following an administrative finding 
of untimeliness, the untimeliness defense is not waived.96  An agency is able to 
refer back to its final ruling of untimeliness when faced with failed 
negotiations and a lawsuit in district court.97  The complainant is left “in no 
worse a position than if the [agency] had originally rejected [the] claim as 
time-barred.”98  Negotiation efforts after the final ruling by the agency 
constituted mere acceptance of the claim and a partial investigation, but the 
fact that negotiations occurred after the final order could not affect the binding 
final order if the complainant attempted to bring a case in federal district 
court.99 
III.  WAIVER OF THE UNTIMELINESS DEFENSE WHEN THIS DEFENSE IS NOT 
RAISED AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL IN FEDERAL SECTOR EEO CASES: 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While courts normally follow the ruling made by the agency as to 
timeliness, the circuit split below depicts how the outcome is less predictable 
when the federal agency fails to state whether the complainant has or has not 
timely met administrative time deadlines. 
A. The Legal Waiver Rule100 
1. Seventh Circuit Approach 
 
 95. See id. at *8. 
 96. See Blount v. Shalala, 32 F. Supp. 2d 339, 341-42 (D. Md. 1999). 
 97. See id. at 342. 
 98. Howell v. Dept. of the Army, 975 F. Supp. 1293, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
 99. The District of Columbia District Court followed the approach of Howell in Thompson v. 
The Capitol Police Board, 120 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2000).  In Thompson, the plaintiff received 
mediation based on his EEO complaint claiming discrimination.  The court, following Howell, 
stated that the meeting between Thompson and the Capital Police Department did not result in a 
waiver of the untimeliness defense.  It further found that “appearance at a mediation session did 
not prejudice the rights of the plaintiff, nor did it deprive him of any opportunity he would have 
enjoyed.  Thus, the defendant’s participation in mediation did not waive its limitations defense.”  
Id. at 83-84. 
 100. “Legal waiver” is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known 
right.”  See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1978).  
The determination of whether there was a waiver is based on the existence of “[a] promise, 
express or implied in fact, supported only by action in reliance thereon, to excuse performance of 
a condition.”  Billman v. V.I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d 1021, 1024 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations 
omitted).  The issue courts focus on under the “Legal Waiver Rule” is whether, based on a finding 
on the merits by an agency, there has been an implicit promise to waive the untimeliness defense 
in later federal court proceedings. 
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When an agency provides a final decision on the merits101 and there is no 
mention of untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts have taken 
different approaches as to whether waiver of the untimeliness defense has 
occurred.  The Seventh Circuit held that, in the event an agency does not 
mention the defense of untimeliness and the case is decided on the merits, the 
untimeliness defense is waived in a subsequent district court action.102  A 
three-prong analysis was provided by the Seventh Circuit to explain its 
conclusion.103 
The three-prong analysis was laid out in Ester v. Principi.  There, 
complainant Ester filed his formal administrative complaint thirty-three days 
after he was provided notice following his informal counseling with an EEO 
officer at the VA.104  This filing was untimely based on § 1614.106(b), which 
states that a formal administrative complaint must be filed within fifteen days 
after receipt of notice to file the complaint.  Despite the late filing, the VA 
made a determination of no discrimination based on the merits of the 
complaint without mention of the untimely filing.105  Judge Williams framed 
the issue, one of first impression for the Seventh Circuit, as: “[W]hen [should] 
an agency’s failure to assert an available exhaustion defense in administrative 
proceedings . . . constitute waiver of such a defense in a subsequent 
lawsuit.”106 
The first part of the analysis provided in Ester is the need for timely 
objection to issues at the administrative level.  Objections not made at the 
administrative level are waived when a case is moved beyond the agency and 
into district court. 107  The requirement that an agency object to untimely filing 
by a complainant at the administrative level 
encourages an agency to [not] overlook and leave completely undeveloped 
allegations that a particular complaint is untimely.  [A]n agency’s failure to 
assert a timeliness defense in its own proceeding causes subsequent courts[.  
 
 101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110 (2001). 
 102. See Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Mundt v. U.S. 
Postal Serv, No. 00C6177, 2001 WL 1313780, at *2  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2001); Smith v. Danzig, 
No. Civ. 00-216-PH, 2001 WL 823642, at *10-11 (D. Me. July 20, 2001).  In Smith, Magistrate 
Justice Cohen from Maine District Court followed Ester.  Justice Cohen stated the belief that the 
First Circuit would adopt the same line of reasoning as provided in Ester if confronted with the 
issue.  See id. at *11. 
 103. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072-73. 
 104. See id. at 1070. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 1071. 
 107. See id. at 1072 (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 
(1952)). 
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But, more importantly,] it creates a significant prejudice to plaintiffs who 
suddenly must defend a claim of untimeliness never before raised.108 
The second of the three-prong approach invoked the rule from SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.109  The Chenery rule states that it is not within a court’s 
province to substitute its own determination for the agency’s stated reasons for 
action.110  Courts are required to act only upon the final determination set out 
by the agency.111  The Court in Chenery stated: 
[I]n dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency 
also is authorized to make, [a reviewing court] must judge the propriety of 
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency . . . .  It will not do for 
a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action; 
nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the 
agency has left vague and indecisive.112 
This Chenery rule was set in the context of notice and comment rule-making: a 
formal structure requiring the agency to examine the evidence before it and 
establish a rule based on such evidence and to explain why it established such 
a rule. 113 
Applying the Chenery rule to federal sector Title VII actions, only if an 
agency states that a complaint is not timely filed can a court review such a 
finding.114  Without a finding of untimeliness, district court review of the 
 
 108. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072 (“Agency autonomy, accuracy and the need for a well-developed 
record for all are served by requiring objections—even those objections possessed by the agency 
itself—to be raised in the agency proceeding”); see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. 
Chicago, 380 F.2d 605, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (procedural objections made to agency must be 
made in timely manner); Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1985); Bd. of Pub. 
Instruction of Taylor County v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1969); James v. Chater, 96 
F.3d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1996) (issues not raised at administrative level are waived in judicial 
examination of the merits); Cellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); Pritchett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 650 F. Supp. 758, 761-62 (D. Md. 1986). 
 109. 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (Chenery II). 
 110. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072 (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196).  See also SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (Chenery I) (“orderly functioning of the process of review 
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and 
adequately sustained”). 
 111. See id.  See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) 
(“[t]he Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”). 
 112. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196-97.  See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 
729, 744 (1985) (noting it is a “rare circumstance” when a reviewing court will attempt to look 
beyond the stated reasons provided by the agency for its actions). 
 113. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 199-200. 
 114. See id. at 196; Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072; Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 
1214 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that at least a brief decision providing reasons for agency action is 
required for sufficient assessment of issues in a particular case). 
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untimeliness defense is precluded.115  This determination is based on 
administrative agencies possessing the expertise to examine whether a 
complainant timely met administrative deadlines and courts are to give 
deference to the factual findings of administrative agencies.116 
The final prong of the analysis is based on analogy to the doctrine of 
waiver applied in federal habeas corpus cases.117  Arguments not raised in state 
court are deemed waived in habeas corpus review at the federal level.118  
“[T]he last state court rendering a judgment [must] make a ‘plain statement’ of 
any adequate and independent state ground” that would preclude federal court 
examination of an issue.119  Otherwise, the basis for judgment on independent 
state grounds is waived.120  Analogizing such reasoning to the issue at hand, 
the court found the independent grounds of failure to timely exhaust 
administrative remedies must be stated by the agency prior to presentation of 
the case to federal district court.121  The Seventh Circuit stated administrative 
exhaustion does not have an “immortal” status: “timely filing of administrative 
claims of discrimination is not necessary to preserve our jurisdiction, and a 
plaintiff’s failure to do so may be waived if the agency reaches the merits 
without addressing the procedural default.”122 
2. Fifth Circuit Approach 
The Fifth Circuit123 and the Second Circuit124 take an approach in tension 
with that of the Seventh Circuit.  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit in Rowe v. 
Sullivan found that to have the untimeliness defense waived, an agency must 
make a “specific finding” that the complaint was filed timely.125  This 
approach insures the untimeliness defense will be preserved if a case reaches 
the district court with a finding on the merits, but not a finding regarding 
timeliness.126  The Fifth Circuit was concerned that “agencies may 
inadvertently overlook timeliness problems and should not thereafter be 
 
 115. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 1072. 
 118. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). 
 119. See Ester, 250 F.3d. at 1072-73 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 1073. 
 123. See, e.g., Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 124. See Belgrave v. Pena, 254 F.3d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 2001).  In Belgrave, the Second Circuit 
adopted the approach taken in Rowe that “the agency must make a specific finding that the 
claimant’s submission was timely.”  Id. at 387. 
 125. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191.  But see Espineuva v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, No. 86 C 
2353, 1987 WL 5241 at *2 (N.D. Ill Jan. 6, 1987). 
 126. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191. 
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bound.”127  Because the agency in Rowe had not made a specific finding of 
timeliness, a waiver of the untimeliness defense had not been made.128  This 
finding by the Fifth Circuit was predated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) finding on the merits that Rowe had not been 
discriminated against by the HHS.129  Despite HHS’s actions on the merits and 
its failure to raise the defense of untimeliness at the administrative level, the 
district court and Fifth Circuit found the claims were barred based on a failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies.130  A decision on the merits did not 
constitute an implicit finding of timeliness.131 
There is tension between the approach of the Fifth and Seventh Circuit.  
The Fifth Circuit does not provide for a waiver of the untimeliness defense 
when untimeliness is not raised at the administrative level, while the Seventh 
Circuit finds a waiver in such a situation.132  In the Fifth Circuit, regardless of 
the determination made by an agency, the untimeliness defense will be 
preserved upon court review.133  The Seventh Circuit examines the decision by 
the agency and if timeliness was not raised as an issue, the untimeliness 
defense is considered waived.134 
B. The Equitable Approach – Examination of Fairness in Determining 
Whether Untimliness Defense has been Waived 
The D.C. Circuit has made use of equitable principles in its analysis of 
whether there is a waiver of the untimeliness defense.135  The D.C. Circuit 
found that the “balancing of equities” favored a waiver of the untimeliness 
defense in an instance where the agency definitively responded to the merits of 
an employee’s complaint without mentioning the untimeliness defense, 
prolonged the case by changing legal positions concerning jurisdiction, and 
failed to raise the untimeliness defense until the case changed jurisdiction three 
times.136 
 
 127. See id. (citations omitted). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 189. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191. 
 132. See Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 133. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191. 
 134. See Ester, 270 F.3d at 1073. 
 135. See, e.g., Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 136. Id. at 438-39.  See also Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1985).  The court 
stated: 
Timely or untimely, the appellants complaints have been exhaustively processed at the 
administrative level.  The litigants have been put to considerable time and expense and so 
have the courts.  Although plaintiff did not itemize and describe these various equitable 
considerations, all are amply evident from the face of the pleadings and the slightest 
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In Bowden v. United States,137 the petitioner, eight months after being 
provided notice that he owed additional taxes on a settlement agreement for 
resolution of a Title VII claim between himself and the Immigrations and 
Naturalization Service (INS), sent a letter to the INS stating that he believed 
the INS was responsible for making such a payment.138  After no response, 
Bowden, thirteen months after receiving the original notice, again wrote the 
agency restating his claim.139  The agency responded to Bowden’s letter, 
asserting that it had paid its full tax duties under the settlement agreement.140  
Within thirty days of receipt of the INS letter, Bowden then sent another letter 
again stating his position and provided that this letter served as notice that 
within thirty days of becoming aware of violation of the settlement agreement 
notice was provided as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(b).141 
A few months later, Bowden filed suit in the D.C. District Court.142  The 
INS stated originally that the claim should be removed to the Court of Federal 
Claims.143  Then, the INS claimed, once in the Court of Federal Claims, that 
the proper jurisdiction was the federal District Court.144  Back again in District 
Court, the INS claimed that Bowden had failed to exhaust his administrative 
 
perusal of the record, and we think the district judge was bound to take them into account 
because we find that the Army has not conducted itself so as to preserve its exhaustion 
defense and further conclude that permitting the Army to raise the defense at this juncture 
would unfairly prejudice the appellant, we conclude that the decision below cannot stand.  
We take a dim view of the Army’s intransigence in this matter, and hope that any further 
litigation will be conducted expeditiously.  Perhaps the time has come for the Army to 
assess its losses and find a modus vivendi with Mr. Brown.  It is certainly past time for all 
the many parts of this litigation to come to an end. 
Id. at 16-18. 
 137. 106 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 138. See id. at 436.  This is not a case falling under the rubric of failure to meet intra-agency 
deadlines under § 1614.106(b) or § 1614.105(a)(1).  Instead, this case deals with the need to 
provide notice within thirty days of violation of a settlement agreement to the federal agency 
violating the agreement.  See § 1614.504(a).  While the circumstances are slightly different, the 
principles concerning waiver under § 1614.504(a) are so closely related to the issue of 
untimeliness under §§ 1614.106(b) and 1614.105(a)(1) as to require this approach be mentioned. 
 139. See Bowden, 106 F.3d at 436. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id.  29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(b) (1991) was recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) 
(1996).  § 1614.504(a) states in part: 
If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with the terms of the 
settlement agreement, the complainant shall notify the [agency’s] Director, in writing, of 
the alleged noncompliance with the settlement agreement, within 30 days of when the 
complainant knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance. 
 142. See Bowden, 106 F.3d at 436. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
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remedies.145  Bowden countered that the INS had waived the defense of 
untimeliness by sending him a letter assessing the merits of the claim and 
stating that the INS was not liable.146  Bowden furthered this claim by asserting 
that the INS had ample opportunity to raise the issue of untimeliness when the 
case was first in District Court and later in the Court of Claims.147  The INS 
instead elected not to raise this issue and, therefore, waived the defense.148  
The District Court agreed with the INS, despite having already been misled on 
the jurisdictional issue by the agency, and dismissed the case for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies.149  The Court of Appeals, clearly agitated by 
the INS’s gamesmanship in moving the case twice and only raising the 
timeliness issue when the case returned to the district court for the second time, 
reversed the district court, agreeing with the plaintiff’s claim that a waiver of 
the untimeliness defense had occurred.150 
The Court of Appeals notably glossed over the need for a final decision on 
the merits by implying that the letter sent by the INS to Bowden constituted a 
decision on the merits.151  Had the INS not forced Bowden to go on what the 
court describes as a “jurisdictional merry-go-round,” it would likely have been 
a closer call as to whether the letter, standing on its own, would have 
convinced the court that a waiver had occurred.152  The court found that, after 
the petitioner had gone through a procedural maze, with the agency devoting a 
large amount of time to jurisdictional gamesmanship, the agency could not 
 
 145. See id. at 436-37. 
 146. See id. at 438-39.  See also Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting that 
when the defense of untimeliness is at issue equitable principles do not entitle the government to 
favored treatment). 
 147. Bowden, 106 F.3d at 439. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 436-37. 
 150. Id. at 438-39. 
 151. Id. at 439.  See also Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  In Pena, the 
court noted that, despite a potential procedural bar being in place, the final decision on the merits 
results in the agency not being able to respond in district court with a claim of failure to exhaust 
procedural requirements.  The court stated: 
Where the agency has taken final action based on an evaluation of the merits, it cannot 
later contend that the complaint failed to exhaust his remedies this does not mean that the 
agency will lose on the merits; it simply means that the complainant is entitled under the 
statute to his day in court. 
Id. at 165 n.7. 
 152. See Bowden, 106 F.3d at 439.  But see De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 578 
(D.D.C. 1978) (declining to find waiver because it would deter agencies from voluntarily 
attempting to find and correct discriminatory practices that are not timely mentioned by the 
complainant); See also Stockton v. Harris, 434 F. Supp. 276, 280-81 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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claim it inequitable to defend the case on the merits.153  Therefore, the defense 
of untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies was waived.154  The court 
concluded its decision by stating: 
[W]e do not intend to create a sweeping principle concerning waiver of 
administrative time limits under Title VII.  [A] balancing of equities in this 
case—where the agency definitively responded to the merits of an employee’s 
complaint without mentioning untimeliness, failed to raise untimeliness until 
the third round in court, and prolonged the litigation for years by shifting legal 
positions—leads us to conclude that the INS waived its defense of untimely 
exhaustion.  The time has come for the Government’s procedural run-around 
of Bowden to end and for a court to address his claim on the merits.155 
C. Waiver of the Untimeliness Defense Only if There is a Finding of 
Discrimination 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted an approach that, when an agency receives 
and investigates a complaint and does not find discrimination, the untimeliness 
defense has not been waived.156  In Boyd v. United States Postal Service,157 the 
complainant was denied reinstatement to a position at the Post Office.158  
Following his rejection, Boyd untimely communicated his belief of 
 
 153. Bowden, 106 F.3d. at 439.  See also Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 24 n.7 (D.D.C. 
1978).  The court in Scott stated that with a decision on the merits, the equities normally dictate 
that the complainant is able to bring a case in district court and the untimeliness defense is 
waived.  See id.  The court stated that “equities justified finding a waiver in [some] 
circumstances.”  Id. at 24 n.7.  This broad principle of equity was developed in later cases within 
the D.C. Circuit.  See, e.g., Bowden, 106 F.3d at 439. 
 154. Bowden, 106 F.3d at 439. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Saltz v. 
Lehman, 672 F.2d 207, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 
1981).  See also Otis v. Frank, No. 87-6527, 1988 WL 131751, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 1988) 
(citing Boyd stating that because the complaint was not timely filed and the final action by the 
agency did not find discrimination there was no waiver of the untimeliness defense); Dailey v. 
Carlin, 654 F. Supp. 146, 149 (E.D. Mo. 1987).  In Dailey, the court did not make a definitive 
ruling that it would adopt the approach taken in Boyd to the issue of waiver.  The court asked the 
parties to provide greater information on the issue before reaching a judgment.  No further 
procedural action is indicated after this request.  The court, however, stated: 
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s failure to timely bring his race claim to the agency 
precludes him from pursuing this court action, even though the agency accepted this claim 
for investigation.  Defendant argues that waiver is not applicable because the agency did 
not make a finding of race discrimination . . . .  The Court is inclined to agree. 
Id. 
 157. 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 158. Id. at 412. 
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discrimination.159  Boyd believed he was discriminated against based on his 
handicap: post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of service in Vietnam.160  
Following the rejection of his reinstatement request, Boyd also contacted his 
Senator, requesting help in gaining reinstatement.161  Upon urging from the 
Senator, the Post Office informed Boyd, via letter, that the issues raised by the 
Senator were being considered.162  Upon a decision by the agency to find 
Boyd’s claim untimely, he filed suit in federal court.163 
The court held that the Post Office’s untimeliness defense had not been 
waived based on there being no finding of discrimination.164  The court stated: 
“The mere receipt and investigation of a complaint does not waive objection to 
a complainant’s failure to comply with the original filing time limit when the 
later investigation does not result in an administrative finding of 
discrimination.”165  The holding in Boyd encompasses a situation where a 
finding on the merits of no discrimination would not amount to a waiver of the 
untimeliness defense.166  Later courts encountering the situation where the 
agency found lack of discrimination on the merits without mention of the 
untimeliness defense have followed Boyd’s holding that, without a finding of 
discrimination, there is no waiver of the untimeliness defense.167 
Only a subtle difference separates the conclusions reached by the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits.  In both circuits, a finding of no discrimination without mention 
of the untimeliness defense would not preclude the agency from asserting an 
untimeliness defense in district court.168  The only difference between the two 
circuits concerns whether there is a finding of discrimination at the 
administrative level without mention of untimeliness and the case is moved to 
district court.169  Here, the Ninth Circuit would rule that, because of the finding 
of discrimination, there was a waiver of the untimeliness defense, while the 
Fifth Circuit would rule that without a specific finding of timeliness the 
untimeliness defense was not waived. 
D. De Novo Court Review 
 
 159. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(i)(1984), predating and recodified at § 1614.105(a)(1) 
(2001). 
 160. Boyd, 752 F.2d at 413. 
 161. Id. at 412. 
 162. Id. at 414. 
 163. Id. at 412. 
 164. Id. at 414. 
 165. Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See e.g., Otis v. Frank, No. 87-6527, 1988 WL 131751, at *2 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 168. See Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414; Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
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A few courts confronted with the issue of whether there was a waiver of 
the untimeliness defense when there is a decision on the merits by the 
administrative agency have examined the issue without regard to the 
determinations made by an agency.170  In Koschoff v. Henderson,171 the court 
held that, even after a trial, the untimeliness defense was not waived.  The 
court appeared to take the procedural deficiencies of the plaintiff into account 
following trial in making a determination on the merits of the case.172  The 
untimeliness defense was vaguely referenced in the court’s summary judgment 
decision and was pointed out sua sponte by the court in its determination of the 
merits of the claim after trial.173  The court held: 
[W]e find Plaintiff’s instant action was filed too late to meet the administrative 
requirements required of her EEO complaints, and we grant Defendant 
judgment based in part on the non-exhaustion and untimeliness of Plaintiff’s 
administrative remedies.  Nevertheless, we emphasize that we have reached 
our ultimate decision based primarily upon the merits of the case, and only 
secondarily upon these procedural issues.174 
Regardless of the agency making a decision to continually ignore the 
opportunity to raise the untimeliness defense, the court felt it important to 
examine the issue, even after a trial in federal district court.175 
IV.  A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ANALYZING THE ISSUE OF WAIVER OF THE 
UNTIMELINESS DEFENSE UNDER TITLE VII FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
A. The “Ester plus ‘technical defect’” approach 
 
 170. See, e.g., Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 168 (D. Md. 2000). 
 171. 109 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D. Penn. 2000). 
 172. Id. at 345. 
 173. Id. at 344.  See also Bruno v. Brady, Civ. A. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (“[W]e should not construe such a timebar provision unduly restrictively, we 
must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would ‘extend the waiver beyond that which 
Congress intended.’”); Humm v. Crowell, No. 97-5988, 1988 WL 869981, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 
30, 1998).  In Crowell, the district court noted that 
Humm sought a de novo review of an unfavorable administrative decision from the 
EEOC.  Consequently, the district court was not bound by the administrative finding of 
the EEOC that Humm’s claim was not barred for his failure to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and timely seek the assistance of an EEO counselor.  While the district court 
was correct in determining that it was not bound by the findings of the EEOC, the court 
did not address whether the TVA should be prevented from challenging its own finding 
that the time limitations did not bar consideration of the merits of Humm’s claim. 
Id. 
 174. Koschoff, 109 F. Supp. at 345. 
 175. Id. 
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Courts should follow Ester’s approach in determining whether or not there 
is a waiver of the defense of untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies 
under Title VII for federal employees when the defense is not raised at the 
administrative level.176  Further, courts should invoke the principle of 
“technical defect” from Time Warner Entertainment Co., thus creating an 
“Ester plus ‘technical defect’” analysis.177  The Seventh Circuit in Ester 
provided convincing analysis of why there is a waiver of the untimeliness 
defense when the defense is not raised at the administrative level.  The 
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit laid out three fundamental principles of 
administrative law that all lead down the same road: if an agency fails to raise 
the untimeliness defense in its final determination of a complaint it waives the 
defense.178  The analysis from Time Warner Entertainment Co. is directly in 
accordance with that from Ester in that, the failure to raise a “technical defect,” 
such as untimely filing at the administrative level, precludes district court 
review of the issue.179 
The first among the three prongs of analysis provided by the Seventh 
Circuit in Ester is the Chenery rule: an agency must clearly state the reasons 
for its actions and stand behind those reasons in later proceedings that examine 
the agency’s actions.180  Review of agency action is limited solely to the 
reasons provided by the agency at the administrative level.181  The second 
prong of analysis provided in Ester is that objections possessed by the agency 
must be raised at the administrative level to be preserved for later court 
evaluation. 182  The important principle of initial agency evaluation is devalued 
if an agency is allowed to raise an untimeliness defense in court that it had not 
mentioned during the administrative process.183  Finally, the Seventh Circuit 
found that if an independent ground for dismissal of a case, such as untimely 
filing, is not raised at the administrative level, it is deemed waived.184  When a 
case reaches federal court without mention of the untimeliness defense, the 
 
 176. Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 2001).  See also supra Part III.A.1. 
 177. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071-72; Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 80-81 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
 178. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071-73. 
 179. Time Warner, 144 F.3d at 80-81. 
 180. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); supra 
notes 110-16. 
 181. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196. 
 182. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 184, 193-95 (1969); supra 
notes 107-08. 
 183. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 195; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (“[W]e believe it 
would be inconsistent with the congressional scheme to bar the [agency] from determining in 
particular cases that full exhaustion of internal review procedures is not necessary for a decision 
to be ‘final’ within the language of [the statutory structure].”). 
 184. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1073. 
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defense does not retain “immortal” status, but can be waived when the Title 
VII claim comes to district court for a decision of the case.185  This reasoning 
was developed based on analogy to federal habeas corpus review: the last state 
court decision must state “independent state ground[s]” for dismissal of an 
action.186  Thus, courts, through use of the “Ester plus ‘technical defect’” 
analysis, promote agency development of complete records and examination of 
all issues implicated in a claim during the administrative process.187 
This three-pronged analysis promotes important policies in administrative 
law.188  The “values of judicial economy, agency autonomy, accuracy and the 
need for a well-developed record for review, are all served by requiring 
objections” by the agency as part of its own administrative process.189 An 
agency does a disservice to its own administrative process by raising the 
untimeliness defense for the first time in district court.190  For a court to make a 
ruling on the untimeliness defense when it is not presented at the 
administrative level, the court would be required to “sift pleadings and 
documents to identify . . . arguments that are not ‘stated with clarity’” during 
the administrative process.191  This is not the function of the federal courts.192  
Inevitably, a process that forces courts to review functions, limited to 
administrative discretion, results in the administrative process being left 
underdeveloped and the agency having no incentive to do a thorough 
investigation of a matter and present a reviewing court with a narrow set of 
issues for examination.193 
A complainant cannot be expected to defend against that which was not 
raised at the administrative level.194  After all, the defendant party in a Title 
VII action following the agency’s final judgment is the federal administrative 
agency that had the opportunity to raise the untimeliness defense.195  With 
awareness that it will later be the defendant party, the agency has every 
incentive to find a complaint untimely.196  An agency that does not object to 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1072; supra notes 24-30. 
 188. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071-73. 
 189. Id. at 1072. 
 190. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 184, 195 (1969). 
 191. Bartholdi Cable Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 279 (1997). 
 192. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072. 
 193. See id.; McKart, 395 U.S. at 195; Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 
1249, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that there must be an opportunity for an agency to 
examine an issue prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies).  In re Steele, 799 F.2d 461, 
466 (9th Cir. 1986); supra notes 24-30. 
 194. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
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the untimely administrative filing of a complaint as a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies presents a surprise defense that the complainant had 
not taken into account when choosing to pursue a Title VII action in district 
court.197  With the agency being required to address objectionable issues at the 
administrative level through use of its expertise, the complainant will be better 
able to make an educated determination of whether it is worth litigating a 
complaint in district court following the administrative process. 
If the administrative agency wants to dismiss an action based on untimely 
filing, such action should be taken at the administrative level.  Dismissal at the 
administrative level prevents extensive and continued review of a case that 
could easily be disposed of by an agency simply stating that administrative 
deadlines were not met.198  The administrative agency is in the best position to 
judge whether administrative deadlines were timely complied with during the 
administrative process.199  When an agency fails to make such a determination, 
it is not for a court to provide for dismissal of a case based on that which the 
agency was in the best position to provide but did not so provide.200 
Directly in accord with the principles from Ester, the analysis from Time 
Warner Entertainment Co. should be added to the analysis of why a failure of 
the agency to raise the untimeliness defense waives the defense in district 
court.  In Time Warner Entertainment Co., the court stated that technical 
defects must be raised at the administrative level, but “policy-based errors” 
could be preserved for district court review based on being a component of a 
broader argument.201  This analysis limits the issues examined by a reviewing 
court to important issues of policy; “technical defects” such as timely filing 
within administrative deadlines are limited to agency review.202  Application of 
a “technical defect” analysis sends a message to agencies that timeliness issues 
must be raised at the administrative level and the failure to raise a “technical 
defect” eliminates the possibility for its examination by a reviewing court.203  
In Title VII actions, important issues surrounding employment discrimination 
are often implicated.  A court’s attention to the issue of untimely 
administrative filing not raised at the administrative level takes away from a 
 
 197. See id.  See also Tinnin v. Danzig, No. CIV. A. 99-1153, 2000 WL 190255, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000) (“The government should not be allowed to undercut [§ 1614.105(a)] by ignoring [the 
untimeliness] defense at the administrative level and belatedly springing it on plaintiff for the first 
time in the district court.”). 
 198. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072-73. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Massachusetts, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sec’y of Agriculture, 984 F.2d 514, 523 
(1st Cir. 1993) 
 201. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 81. 
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court’s focus on important policy issues.204  While issues of discrimination lie 
in wait, courts should not be drawn into a situation of delving back into the 
administrative process to determine whether or not administrative deadlines 
were met.205 
Kenneth Culp Davis submitted, in his Administrative Law Treatise, “courts 
would experience difficulty attempting to apply the technical/policy distinction 
in many cases.”206  As a matter of general theory, Davis is most likely correct 
in arguing that such a distinction is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.  
Such a distinction, however, provides some structure to the fact-sensitive 
doctrines of exhaustion and waiver.207  While determining what is “policy-
based” and what is a “technical defect” is difficult, due to unclear boundaries 
existing between the two, the dichotomy provides a structure that removes the 
need for unguided fact-sensitive inquisitions over whether or not there was a 
waiver of the exhaustion requirement.208  The structure developed by the D.C. 
Circuit limits some of the confusion as to when exhaustion is required and 
when it is waived, thus creating a more predictable system.209  Further, this 
dichotomy limits court review to cases with policy-based implications.  Thus, 
court review is restricted to important issues of policy and courts are excluded 
from examining issues where the administrative agency failed to follow 
through with technical defects that could easily have been examined without 
court intervention.210 
B. Unjustified Criticism of Ester v. Principi 
Early negative commentary regarding Ester appears unjustified.  Major 
Jeannine C. Hamby, an Army lawyer, stated: 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision in Ester may discourage 
federal agencies from investigating substantively meritorious discrimination 
claims.  Its requirement that an agency raise any timeliness issue during the 
administrative process may unintentionally cause EEO counselors to focus 
only on the procedural aspects, rather than the merits, of the claims. The EEO 
counselor may then dismiss otherwise meritorious claims that deserve 
investigation.  The administrative process is designed to resolve claims at the 
 
 204. See generally id. at 80-81. 
 205. See id.; Borden v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 206. DAVIS & PIERCE, JR., supra note 37, § 15.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2000). 
 207. See Time Warner, 144 F.3d at 80. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. at 80-81. 
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lowest level, with a view towards doing the right thing. Whether the court’s 
decision in Ester hurts or helps the system remains to be seen.211 
This reasoning is flawed in that Ester asserts an entirely different goal than 
Hamby suggests.  The Seventh Circuit in Ester affirmed that it is not 
attempting to rewrite the established principle that a complaint may be 
accepted and investigated without a waiver of the untimeliness defense.212  
Judge Williams specifically stated: “Nor does our rule prevent an agency from 
deciding the merits of a complaint at the risk of losing a timeliness objection; 
the agency is free to find the complaint untimely, and nonetheless proceed to 
address the merits of the case.”213  An agency that wishes to address an 
untimely complaint on the merits in an attempt to redress the grievances of a 
complainant but wants to limit its involvement in the matter to the 
administrative process may specifically state that a complaint is untimely but 
provide a supplementary decision on the merits.214  This insures that there is a 
specific finding of untimeliness if the complainant attempts to pursue the 
matter beyond the administrative process.215 
The suggestion that Ester provides the overbearing requirement on EEO 
counselors of requiring a check of two filing dates is equally perplexing.  
Hamby appears concerned that Ester will require “[l]abor counselors [to] be 
vigilant to preserve timeliness issues during the administrative processing of 
complaints.”216  An EEO counselor would be required to check two dates: 
when the complainant initiated contact and when the administrative complaint 
was filed.217  This minimal work for the EEO counselor is best done at the 
administrative level and the postponement of the issue until a case reaches 
district court only results in the agency failing to examine timely filing under 
its own deadlines, failing to use its expertise in federal Title VII cases, and 
creating a surprise defense against the plaintiffs.218  Concerning the need for 
EEO counselors to be “vigilant,” the administrative process will be improved 
by requiring counselors to develop fuller records, and thus reviewing courts 
will be provided a better assessment of the potential strengths and weaknesses 
of a particular claim prior to the case reaching them.219 
 
 211. Jeannine C. Hamby, Assert Timeliness Issue Early to Preserve the Defense in Title VII 
Cases, 2001NOV ARMY LAW. 35, 36 (2001). 
 212. Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1072 n.1 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Hamby, supra note 211, at 36. 
 217. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105(a)(1), 1614.106(b) (2001). 
 218. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072; Tinnin v. Danzig, No. CIV. A. 99-1153, 2000 WL 190255, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2000). 
 219. See id. 
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Lastly, Hamby argues that Ester does not identify the time by which the 
agency must identify the complaint as untimely and that “[f]ailure to raise a 
timeliness defense early may waive the Army’s ability to raise this potentially 
dispositive issue in federal court.”220  This conclusion is at tension with the 
very holding of Ester: “[W]hen an agency decides the merits of a complaint, 
without addressing the question of timeliness, it has waived a timeliness 
defense in a subsequent lawsuit.”221  The use of the phrase “decides the merits” 
indicates that the agency must address the issue of untimely filing at a time 
prior to a final decision of the agency on the merits or as part of the agency’s 
final decision.222  The plain language of the holding in Ester suggests that a 
finding, as part of an agency’s final decision, on the timeliness issue, will 
suffice to preserve the untimeliness defense in later court proceedings.223 
C. Problems with the approaches taken by other Circuits 
The reasoning provided by circuits outside of the Seventh Circuit is not 
sufficiently grounded in basic principles of administrative law and, therefore, 
the result is faulty and contains incomplete legal reasoning and conclusions.  
The Fifth Circuit stated that a “specific finding” of timeliness must be made by 
the administrative agency to waive the defense of untimeliness in later court 
proceedings.224  The Fifth Circuit claimed this holding was appropriate based 
on the possibility that an agency inadvertently overlooked a timeliness issue.225  
Such a conclusion is flawed, however, because it fails to require 
determinations, within the province of the agency, to be left to agency 
discretion.226  For agencies to be allowed to ignore the untimeliness defense 
and then raise the defense in district court is to allow agencies to prejudice 
plaintiffs with defenses in district court that were not implicated as part of the 
administrative process.227  To follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Rowe is to 
allow for agency inefficiency and open the door to continued claims of 
discrimination reaching the district courts without mention of the untimeliness 
defense.  Thus, the result of the Fifth Circuit approach is to force courts to rule 
on the untimeliness defense when untimely filing issues could have been 
evaluated and decided at the administrative level.228 
 
 220. Hamby, supra note 211, at 36. 
 221. Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071-72. 
 222. Id. at 1072. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072. 
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The D.C. Circuit in Bowden stated that an agency’s decision on the merits, 
along with consideration of equitable principles, determines whether there is a 
waiver of the untimeliness defense when the defense was not raised as part of 
the administrative process.229  Based on the time and effort that had already 
been put into the process by the plaintiff after the agency had ruled on the 
merits of the complaint, it would have been inequitable to find Bowden had not 
exhausted his administrative remedies.230  The D.C. Circuit’s analysis fails to 
provide a definitive answer to whether the administrative agency waives the 
untimeliness defense when it is not raised at the administrative level.  The D.C. 
Circuit’s evaluation of the untimeliness defense is narrowly applicable to a 
claimant who was forced to have venue changed several times prior to the 
untimeliness defense being raised.231  Such analysis has little practical 
implication as the defense is most commonly raised upon a case being 
presented to the district court from the administrative agency.232 
Because the D.C. Circuit’s analysis has such limited applicability, it does 
not provide needed structure to the issue of when the untimeliness defense is 
waived.233  It also provides a false impression that just because a complainant 
has not gone on a “jurisdictional merry-go-round” the agency has not waived 
the untimeliness defense.234  The D.C. Circuit stated its holding was limited to 
the facts of the case, but a defendant agency could easily distinguish a case 
based on having not changed jurisdiction three times.235  Without the D.C. 
Circuit laying out a rule that states under what circumstances such a waiver 
occurs, it has developed an unreliable and unnecessarily ad hoc jurisprudence 
regarding the untimeliness defense.236  In contrast, the “Ester plus ‘technical 
defect’” analysis establishes a definite rule where the agency must examine 
timeliness issues or waive the untimeliness defense. 
The determination by the Ninth Circuit, that there must be a finding of 
discrimination by the agency to establish a waiver of the untimeliness defense, 
is based on questionable reasoning.237  The Ninth Circuit was concerned that to 
find waiver of the untimeliness defense would affect the ability of an agency to 
investigate complaints during the administrative process.238  An agency might 
 
 229. Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See supra notes 24-30. 
 233. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 234. Bowden, 106 F.3d at 439. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. (“[W]e do not intend to create a sweeping principle concerning waiver of 
administrative time limits under Title VII.”). 
 237. See Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 238. Id. 
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limit its analysis to procedural issues and not focus on the merits of a 
complaint.239  However, to require there be a finding on the merits of 
discrimination for there to be a waiver of the untimeliness defense blends 
together the merits of a discrimination claim with the procedural requirements 
placed upon a complainant to complete the administrative process.  If an 
agency addresses a complaint on the merits, the subsequent district court 
considerations should be based solely on whether the agency was correct in its 
assessment that no discrimination occurred.  There is no basis for changing the 
analysis concerning a procedural issue, such as untimely filing, because a 
certain finding was made on the merits.240 
Similarly, the Alabama District Court in Koschoff based its analysis on an 
interwoven fabric of the merits and the procedural issue of untimeliness.241  
The district court refused to give up its quest to have the defendant raise the 
untimeliness defense.242  An agency’s decision not to raise an untimeliness 
defense is within the province of the agency during the administrative 
process.243  Therefore, the court in Koschoff trounced upon the intricacies of 
the administrative process by making an inquiry, in its district court decision 
on the merit of a discrimination claim, into the procedural deficiencies of the 
claimant during the administrative process.244 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 
(1985). 
 241. Koschoff v. Henderson, 109 F. Supp. 2d 332, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 242. Id. at 344-45. 
 243. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969). 
 244. See Sampson v. Civiletti, 632 F.2d 860, 862-63 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, courts often do not recognize the circuit split 
implicated in this Comment.245  Courts fail to distinguish between a situation 
where the administrative agency made a determination that a complaint was 
untimely and a situation where the administrative agency made a determination 
based on the merits of a complaint without mention of untimeliness.246  When 
an administrative agency makes a determination on the merits without 
mentioning untimely filing, the agency has moved beyond a complainant’s 
compliance with administrative deadlines and has implicitly found a timely 
filing to have been made.247  However, when a specific finding of untimeliness 
is made, the defense of untimeliness is preserved.248  Courts, by making this 
distinction, insure that federal administrative agencies realize that a complaint 
must be found untimely during the administrative process or there is a waiver 
of the untimeliness defense.249 
Ester stands for an evolution in jurisprudence surrounding the untimeliness 
defense.  The case, decided in May, 2001, sends a strong message that there 
needs to be a differentiation between a case where there is a specific finding as 
to whether administrative deadlines were timely met, and a case where no 
administrative finding was made regarding timely exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.  Ester provides this formulation by basing its analysis in 
fundamental principles of administrative law.  These principles appear to have 
become remote considerations in the reasoning provided by other courts in 
determining whether the untimeliness defense has been waived.  In addition, 
the “technical defect” analysis from Time Warner Entertainment Co. furthers 
this reasoning by providing that procedural matters, such as timely filing, 
should be resolved at the administrative level or the matter is deemed 
waived—more important issues of policy are reserved for district court 
 
 245. See Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting the circuit split at 
issue when there is no mention of the untimeliness defense at the administrative level). 
 246. See Williams v. West, No. C 95-2456SI, C 95-2547 SI, 1997 WL 811777, at *3-4 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 16, 1997) (following Boyd without noting that there was a decision on the merits in the 
case at issue, but not in Boyd).  See also Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1996).  
The Second Circuit in Briones followed the analysis in Girard and found that when a claimant 
fails to meet the statutory deadline to bring a complaint, the express finding by the EEOC of 
timeliness precluded the district court from ruling the case untimely.  The court stated that a 
“governmental agency defendant may not have ‘a second bite at the apple’ by arguing lack of 
timely filing in federal court after failing to challenge an EEOC determination that the complaint 
was timely filed.”  Id. at 291 (following Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 247. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) 
(noting that court review of administrative decisions is limited to examination of the factors the 
administrative agency considered). 
 248. See supra notes 69-99. 
 249. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1073. 
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assessment.  The hopeful goal of this Comment is that courts recognize the 
issues herein and provide an analysis grounded in basic principles of 
administrative law. 
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